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Regulating the Digital Resonance
HASSAN SALMAN*

Abstract
The proliferation of automated content moderation in social media has
negatively impacted users’ (individuals, businesses, and governments) selfexpressions. Major social media platforms like Facebook act as public forums for billions of users whose content may vary in terms of acceptability
and legality. User content is colored by social as well as personal norms,
values and experiences. For example, though blasphemy may be objectionable in Poland, it may not be so in France. However, despite facing some
mistrust over how Facebook and other platforms handle user data and moderate content, users rely on the entities like Facebook to correctly filter this
type of content in order to maintain clean and safe platforms. Although, due
to the volume of user content; the lack of human moderators; and pressures
from governments to prevent the spread of illegal or objectionable content
such as mass shootings and misinformation, these platforms have increasingly employed machine learning algorithms to filter user content automatically. Automated content moderation often fails to fully differentiate between illegal and legal, though possibly objectionable, content and can
result in unnecessary user censure. Moreover, efforts to preempt costly government regulations through proactive self-regulation have exasperated this
issue. By comparing how, why and in what manner the United States, the
European Union and the Facebook Oversight Board regulate Facebook’s
content moderation practices, this article introduces alternative methods of
content moderation.

* I would like to thank Professor Fernanda Nicola at the Washington College of Law for guiding
me through this topic, and her seemingly endless patience. I would also like to thank Stephanie
Don and the UC Hastings Science and Technology Journal editors for giving me the opportunity
to publish this paper. Their diligence throughout the editing process were what made this publication possible.
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I. Introduction
25 years ago, Justice Kennedy noted that, “minds are not changed in
streets and parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in
mass and electronic media.”1
Billions of users worldwide use social networking platforms like Facebook and YouTube to communicate, share content, or even sell items for
whatever purpose they see fit [albeit within limits determined by the platform].2 User content varies in complexity and can be as straightforward as,
“I saw Tom Cruise at Trader Joe’s today,” to something more complex e.g.,
critiquing the US immigration system by overlaying an image of caged immigrants with quotes from ‘The Irony of American History’ by Reinhold
Niebuhr.3 User content can be nuanced and as such it can make content moderation difficult. Human content moderators spend an average of 10-15 seconds per image; however, that time frame can often be as short as two seconds per image.4 That said, due to incidents like the livestreaming of the
Christchurch shootings on Facebook, lawmakers around the world began
closely scrutinizing how these platforms moderate content i.e., the means
and methods by which platforms monitor, filter, rank, and block user generated content.5 This pressure has led to the need for automated moderation
since human moderators generally cannot keep up with the content and usually have little training or support; nevertheless, automated moderation is
insufficiently capable of understanding the contextual nuances of human languages.6
1. DAPHNE KELLER, Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power over Online
Speech, HOOVER WORKING GROUP ON NATIONAL SECURITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, Aegis Series Paper No. 1902, (January 2019) (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 US 727, 802-3 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
2. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45650, Free Speech and the Regulation of
Social Media Content (2019).
3. John C. Bennett, The Irony of American History work by Niebuhr, ENCYC.
BRITANNICA (2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Irony-of-American-History.
4. FREDERIK STJERNFELT & ANNE M. LAURITZEN, YOUR POST HAS BEEN REMOVED
134 (2020) (noting that one Facebook moderator working eight hours a day from 2008 to 2013,
processed 15,000 images a day).
5. HANNAH BLOCH-WEHBA, Automation in Moderation, 53 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 41, 42-3
(2020).
6. Access Now, Protecting Free Expression in the Era of Online Content Moderation: Access Now’s preliminary recommendations on content moderation and Facebook’s planned oversight board 5, ACCESSNOW.ORG (May 2019), https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2019/05/AccessNow-Preliminary-Recommendations-On-Content-Moderation-andFacebooks-Planned-Oversight-Board.pdf.
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Throughout this article, the terms ‘content moderation’ and [mandatory] takedowns will be mentioned but these are distinct notions. Content
legality varies between countries and when a company is ordered to take
content down, that is a mandatory takedown; however, removing content that
may be legal albeit undesirable (e.g., certain kinds of hate speech) to the
internet service is an example of content moderation.7
Moderation standards vary between platforms, but they generally rely
on several of the same sources to identify content for removal: (1) users [to
flag impermissible content]; (2) employed content moderators; and (3) artificial intelligence (“AI”) (using machine learning to develop automated content filters).8 Few platforms rely on machine learning models to identify new
content that could violate their terms and conditions, and most rely on models that have been trained to identify specific phrases and images.9 Facebook
successfully used the latter to tag 99% of violent and graphic content before
users reported on it.10
Conversely, with bullying and harassment content that success rate
dropped to 16%, indicating that moderators are [at least for now] better
suited to flag such content.11 As discussed throughout this article, platforms
have an economic incentive to remove offensive and illegal content, thereby
increasing their reliance on automated content filters.12 Due to this combination of economic and political pressure, content deemed as objectionable/offensive but not illegal has been excessively removed.13 User-generated content is also colored by societal norms, personal experiences, values, etc., thus
attempting to moderate “objectionable” content without accounting for these
underlying issues has, and will continue to undermine user speech.
While social media platforms have existed for some time, legal and
technical developments regarding the aforementioned issues are ongoing, so
the existing literature will need to be updated in light of those developments
and their effects. Existing literature14 on content moderation practices generally focuses on regional laws; factors affecting moderation practices; and
the ramifications of those practices with respect to various categories of
7. Id. at 2.
8. CLARE Y. CHO & JASON A. GALLO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46662, Social Media: Misinformation and Content Moderation Issues for Congress 6 (2021).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 12; BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 61.
13. STJERNFELT & LAURITZEN, supra note 4, at 129-30. (noting that despite Facebook’s allegedly nuanced approach to adult nudity and sexuality, Facebook has repeatedly deleted and reinstated photos of ‘Venus from Willendorf’).
14. Statistical data, Case law, Law review articles, Tech blogs, Government research groups,
think tanks as well as Academic texts and articles.
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content. However, the literature does not sufficiently assess how content
moderation developments have led to the excessive removal of ‘objectionable content,’ and how this problem might be reined in. Nevertheless, these
issues are relatively new and have incurred major developments like Europe’s Digital Services Acts Package (which is not yet in force)15; additionally, there is also the Facebook Oversight Board which decided to uphold
President Trump’s ban from Facebook and Instagram three weeks prior to
the writing of this article.16 The ramifications of these developments have
yet to be fully determined, and it is possible that the conclusions drawn in
this article will lose some of their relevance.
Despite these problems, this article can serve to bridge some of the gaps
left by previous studies. First, this article will focus on the impact that current
moderation practices have on harmful, but not necessarily illegal content,
(i.e. objectionable content) and the value in developing alternative practices.
This analysis will be grounded in interrelated studies on social media platforms and content moderation practices by the most influential and sociopolitically relevant platforms, especially Facebook. Facebook’s broad reach
and controversial reputation throughout the US and EU have, and will continue to affect extensive legal and political ramifications.17 Second, this article will focus on the US and EU’s approaches to regulating social media
platforms like Facebook. This is partially due to their similar perspectives on
free speech, their readily accessible, and extensive data, along with their
studies on content moderation. Further, though the US and EU have similar
perspectives on the right to free speech, the EU has demonstrated a greater
willingness to relegate free speech in favor of safety and economic concerns.
This difference, and the subsequent results of that regulation (the Digital Services Act [DSA]) sharply contrast with the US’ relatively slow approach to
content moderation. The DSA presents an example of how contemporary,
stringent, and systematically applied regulatory practices are likely to affect
major platforms. Third, these developments can be compared against Facebook’s attempt at self-regulation: The Oversight Board. The Board is an independent body developed by Facebook to help the company regulate its
content moderation decisions, especially insofar as objectionable content is
15. Questions and Answers: Digital Services Act, EUR. COMM’N (May 20, 2022),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_2348.
16. See generally, Annabelle Gawer, Nick Srnicek, Online Platforms: Economic and Societal
Effects, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE, PE 656.336 (Mar. 2021); Trump
Decision – FB Oversight Board. Case Decision 2021-001-FB-FBR (concerning ‘Violence and
Criminal Behavior’ and ‘Safety’ as opposed to ‘Objectionable Content’).
17. See infra Part II(A).
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concerned. Finally, by synthesizing these various approaches to content
moderation, and assessing their strengths and weaknesses, this article will
attempt to present alternative solutions to the objectionable content problem.
In Part II(A) Facebook’s [and other platforms’] content moderation
methodologies, and the economic rationale behind these methods will be explained. This will help explain some of the main problems with contemporary content moderation practices. In Part II(B)(i), statistical data will be
used to highlight Facebook’s reach and usage throughout the US and EU, as
well as the extent to which users trust Facebook’s moderation practices. Following this, Part II(B)(ii) will outline how, despite public mistrust, social
media companies are nevertheless relied upon to keep their platforms safe
and clean; however, this reliance, and sometimes over reliance will be shown
to have its own drawbacks. In Part II(C) the differentiated impacts that the
US & EU legal approaches have had on content moderation practices will be
analyzed using the existing literature. Further, Facebook’s attempt at regulating its moderation practice by establishing an independent Board, a Facebook ‘Supreme Court,’ will add to this analysis. However, because the Board
is so new its true impact on Facebook’s practices is unknown at the time this
article was written, thus this part of the analysis will be comparatively short.
That said, the Board has already rendered several decisions, and grounded
its holdings in a myriad of established laws and rules. Moreover, because of
the Board’s structure and alleged influence over Facebook, its impact may
likely be similar to an actual court of law. As the current literature largely
precedes the Board’s decisions on objectionable content, Part III will contain
a synthesized analysis of the previous sections: draw on the implications and
conclusions of those sections to add to the existing literature; develop a new
approach to moderating objectionable content; and highlight how future research may advance or even diminish the value of this methodology.

II. How Social Media Platforms Work, and Why That’s a
Problem
A. The Root Of The Problem

Social media platforms utilize a business model that is both a source of
success and widespread criticism. The core of a social networks’ business
model, including and perhaps especially Facebook, is the ‘attention economy.’ 18 This is the tactic of matching users to the most relevant information
for them and monetizing that attention through targeted ads or transactions.19

18. Tambiama Madiega, Digital Services Act, THE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR
PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE, PE 689.357, 4 (Mar. 2021).
19. Id.
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This tactic compliments a concept known as ‘the network effect,’ which refers to the understanding that the more users a platform has (i.e. the bigger
the user network), the more useful it becomes to people who have not already
joined the social network.20 Thus, the better the network can capture its users’ attention, the more users it can acquire and the greater its revenue becomes.21 Revenue streams may vary but are mostly derived from online, targeted advertisements.22 Maximizing user engagement and deriving revenue
from online ads is the foundation of these platforms’ business models, with
US social media ad revenues totaling $35.6 billion in 2019.23 Additionally,
though time spent on Facebook was expected to drop in 2020 to 33 minutes
a day among [adult] US users, US advertisers were actually expected to increase their social network spending by 20.4% in 2020, and 16.9% in 2021. 24
This means that ad revenues for social networks were expected to increase
from approximately $36 billion in 2019, to $45.53 billion in 2020 to $50.86
billion in 2021.25 That said, it is the means by which social media platforms
generate this revenue that the controversy becomes apparent – the ‘attention
economy.’ Platforms curate, categorize and rank content based on the users’
interactions with the site and other factors; however, to do this effectively,
platforms use non-human, code-based processes to tailor and predict which
content is likely to be relevant (algorithms).26 These algorithms allow platforms to sort through massive amounts of user-generated posts and behaviors
(data) to estimate which content (e.g. ads) would be most relevant to each
user and disseminate that content accordingly.27 Therefore, more data means

20. Arjun Sundararajan, Network Effects, N.Y.U. STERN SCH. OF BUS. (Dec. 23, 2020),
http://oz.stern.nyu.edu/io/network.html.
21. CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 3.
22. Id. at 12 (finding that global online advertising accounted for 98% of Facebook’s annual
revenue in 2019).
23. Interactive Advert. Bureau, Internet Advertising Revenue Report: Full Year 2019 Results
& Q1 2020 Revenues (May 2020), https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/FY19-IABInternet-Ad-Revenue-Report_Final.pdf (defining social media as ads delivered on platforms including social networking and social gaming websites and apps, across all device types, including
desktop, laptop, smartphone and tablet).
24. Debra A. Williamson, US Social Trends for 2020: eMarketer’s Predictions for the Year
Ahead, EMARKETER (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-social-trends-for2020.
25. Id.
26. BRANNON, supra note 2, at 1 (citing Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161
UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 1445, 1448 (2013)).
27. CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 25.

42

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14:1

more refined algorithms which in turn lead to more accurate ads.28 Facebook’s algorithm for example can allegedly predict a user’s personality with
greater accuracy than their own spouse by analyzing only 300 ‘likes.’29 One
side effect of this is that echo chambers tend to develop wherein users become exposed to one kind of content instead of a range of voices and opinions.30 Further, since algorithms tend to reward visceral and emotive content,
this process has exacerbated the spread of misinformation, especially since
the 2016 US elections [see Part II(B)(i) below].31 Although, to keep users
engaged and government regulators appeased, platforms have been using
this technology to try to prevent the dissemination of such harmful or unlawful online content before it is ever seen or distributed.32 The problem though,
is that the incentive to remove illegal content like the Christchurch shootings
has also led to the removal of unpopular but not necessarily illegal content
(objectionable content).33 This incentive has broad ramifications for the entire internet speech ecosystem and, as Justice Kennedy noted, will likely impact the interchange of ideas, and the shaping of public consciousness.34
B. The Problem
i.

Quantity of Users & Mistrust

Due to its popularity and business model, Facebook has engendered
broad but divided public scrutiny, especially with regards to how it handles
user data and moderates content. The majority of US adults use Facebook
(69%), and the majority of those users (around 70%) visit the site on a daily
basis.35 In a 2018 survey, seven of eight Western European countries surveyed responded that a third or more of their adult population use social media to get their news on a daily basis.36 Additionally, over 60% of social
28. Id.
29. Social Media Influences our Political Behavior and puts Pressure on our Democracies,
New Report Finds, EU SCIENCE HUB (Oct. 27, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/social-media-influences-our-political-behaviour-and-puts-pressure-our-democracies-new-report-finds.
30. Gawer & Srnicek, supra note 16, at 58.
31. Id.
32. BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 42-3.
33. STJERNFELT & LAURITZEN, supra note 4, at 122-23 (noting that examples of objectionable
content include hate speech, graphic violence, and nudity or sexual acts).
34. KELLER, supra note 1, at 23.
35. John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and Facebook, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 1,
2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/01/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/.
36. Amy Mitchell et. al., In Western Europe, Public Attitudes Toward News Media More Divided by Populist Views Than Left-Right Ideology, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 14, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2018/05/14/in-western-europe-public-attitudes-towardnews-media-more-divided-by-populist-views-than-left-right-ideology/ (polling users in Sweden,
Germany, France, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, UK & Italy).
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media consumers in each of the eight countries cited Facebook as the most
frequently used social media source for news.37 Though only 43% of US
adults use Facebook as a news source, news results may vary for both EU &
US users depending on how those users interact with the site.38 These variations occur because Facebook’s algorithms curate and present content that
they predict will have a more likely chance of engaging the user e.g., divisive
or provocative content.39 Slides presented by an internal Facebook team to
company executives in 2018 stated, “our algorithms exploit the human
brain’s attraction to divisiveness,” and warned that the algorithms would promote “more and more divisive content in an effort to gain user attention and
increase time on the platform.”40 Accordingly, US users across the political
spectrum largely agree that social media’s effects on the US have been
mostly negative; however, this belief is particularly widespread among Republicans.41 In 2020, studies showed that misgivings among 90% of republicans and right leaning independents partially stemmed from their belief that
social media platforms are biased against conservatives and very likely engage in political censorship.42 In 2020, this belief was shared among 59% of
Democrats and left leaning independents, and 73% of US adults.43 This variance is even greater with regards to how much each party trusts platforms
to label content as inaccurate or misleading.44 Similarly, in 2018, Eurobarometer found that of the respondents from the 28 EU member states, only
26% trusted news and information accessed on social networks; moreover,
37. Id.
38. CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 25.
39. See supra Part II(A).
40. CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 10-11 (citing Jeff Horowitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Executives Shut Down Efforts to Make the Site Less Divisive, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2020,
11:38AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-it-encourages-division-top-executivesnixed-solutions-11590507499?reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink.
41. Brooke Auxier, 64% of Americans Say Social Media Have a Mostly Negative Effect on
the Way Things are Going in the US Today, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/15/64-of-americans-say-social-media-have-a-mostly-negative-effect-on-the-way-things-are-going-in-the-u-s-today/ (finding that 53% of Democrats and left leaning independents, and 78% of Republicans and right leaning independents believe that social media
has a negative impact on the US).
42. Emily A. Vogels, Andrew Perrin and Monica Anderson, Most Americans Think Social
Media Sites Censor Political Viewpoints, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-americans-think-social-media-sites-censor-political-viewpoints/#fn-26445-1.
43. Id.
44. Id. (finding that 73% of Democrats strongly or somewhat approved of this process,
whereas 71% of Republicans at least somewhat disapproved of this process).
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in 2019, Eurostat found that only 25% of EU citizens aged between 16 and
74 claimed to have provided personal information to social networks.45 Thus,
data handling and content moderation seem to be among the major areas of
concern amongst European and US users.
ii.

Effect of Excessive Moderation

Nevertheless, despite these concerns, users still rely on companies like
Facebook and others to keep their platforms clear of objectionable content.
“A sizable majority of US users (66%) say companies have a responsibility
to remove offensive content from their platforms . . . .”46 However, nearly
half (48%) of these users admitted to not being sure about what constitutes
offensive content, and even fewer (31%) “have a great deal or fair amount
of confidence in these companies to determine what offensive content should
be removed.”47 Correspondingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs concluded that drawing the line
between objectionable/offensive and unobjectionable, in good faith, is something that goes beyond the law; moreover, that distinction is rooted in the
plurality and diversity of the users, and providers of the digital environment
within which the objectionable content manifests.48 Certain content is universally objectionable (e.g., videos of animal torture) while others may be
objectionable to some (e.g., blasphemy), and everything else falls somewhere within the spectrum.49 Therefore, establishing content moderation
rules that work with all types of content is problematic. Despite this problem,
Facebook responded to these concerns through a continuously developing
set of Community Standards wherein it divided objectionable content into
four parts: (1) Hate Speech; (2) Violent and Graphic content; (3) Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity; and (4) Sexual Solicitation (the fourth is a new

45. Flash Eurobarometer 464: Fake News and Disinformation Online, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, at 4-5, 9 (Apr. 2018),
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2183; Social Media: Security Concerns of Sharing
Information, EUROSTAT (Oct. 13, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostatnews/-/edn-20201013-1.
46. John Laloggia, U.S. Public Has Little Confidence in Social Media Companies to Determine Offensive Content, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/07/11/u-s-public-has-little-confidence-in-social-media-companies-to-determine-offensive-content/.
47. Id.
48. Giovanni Sartor & Andrea Lorregia, The impact of Algorithms for Online Content Filtering or Moderation: “Upload Filters”, EUR. PARL. COMM. ON CITIZENS’ RTS. AND CONST. AFF. 55
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/657101/IPOL_STU(2020)657101_EN.pdf.
49. See infra Part II(C).
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category while ‘Cruel & Insensitive’ was incorporated into Hate Speech).50
Though laudable, these efforts were, and continue to be, hampered by two
major issues: (a) the nuance of human languages, and (b) over-reliance on
content filtering technology.51 One early problem that came up were statements which “merely cite or parody” the hateful statements of others.52 In
response, Facebook stated that users had to be clear as to their intent otherwise their posts would be removed.53 Clear intent is a problem when the
message is, for example, meant to be ironic; this is especially an issue when
considered on a global scale.54 Facebook has 3 billion active users as of August 2020 with the average user spending 50 minutes a day on Facebook and
Instagram; additionally, in 2019 Facebook received 76 million appeals to
restore posts that were taken down, only 23% of which (1.748 million) were
restored.55 A further 284 million pieces of content were restored without appeal.56 Facebook has only 15,000 human moderators; the sheer volume of
data it deals with daily requires some amount of automated moderation.57
Aside from a lack of human moderators, the increased spread of online misinformation and illegal content galvanized lawmakers around the world to
closely scrutinize the content moderation process.58 Regulators thus imposed
certain regulatory strategies like encouraging platforms to use content moderation technology to prevent unlawful online content from being disseminated before it is published.59 Through court rulings and legislation, the EU
and US implemented different regulatory strategies; however, increased regulatory pressure, along with some misguided assumptions about how content
filters work have led to mixed and, sometimes detrimental ramifications in
50. Writing
Facebook’s
Rulebook,
META
(Apr.
10,
2019),
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/04/insidefeed-community-standards-development-process/;
STJERNFELT & LAURITZEN, supra note 4, at 122-23 (citing Facebook’s Community Standards,
META, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/objectionable_content (last visited May
17, 2021)).
51. Daphne Keller, Facebook Filters, Fundamental Rights, and the CJEU’s GlawischnigPiesczek Ruling, 69 GRUR INT’L 616, 619 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/grurint/ikaa047.
52. STJERNFELT & LAURITZEN, supra note 4, at 124.
53. Id. at 124-25.
54. Id.
55. See CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 7; Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16, at 18.
56. CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 7.
57. See John Koetsier, Report: Facebook Makes 300,000 Content Moderation Mistakes Every
Day, FORBES (June 9, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/06/09/300000-facebook-content-moderation-mistakes-daily-report-says/?sh=30c5a70854d0.
58. See BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 42-43.
59. Id.
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the internet speech ecosystem.60 The tools used to exploit the ‘attention economy’ have been a source of success and strife for platforms and their users,
and, as seen below, government attempts to [partially] co-opt these tools
have sometimes backfired.
C. Legal Background
i.

Overview of the US & EU Regulatory History

Despite facing a similar diffusion of illegal and objectionable forms of
content, the United States and Europe have greatly diverged in their respective regulatory approaches. While the US and EU value similarly the consequence of restricting free speech, the EU nevertheless imposes specific limitations on, for example, hate speech; moreover, EU members are permitted
to restrict certain kinds of speech, including across social media.61 The impact of this fragmented form of legislation on the European Single Market,
along with the aforementioned spread of illegal and offensive content, has
led to major regulatory efforts against platforms like Facebook, the full ramifications of which are unknown at this time.62 Conversely, the US’ largely
restrained approach to free speech has had relatively less impact on platforms;63 however, as seen below, even location specific regulations can have
a global impact on the way a platform functions.
ii.

US Approach to Regulating Social Media Platforms

Under US law, content moderation by private companies remains
largely in the latter’s hands except with regards to specific kinds of illegal
content. Attempts at directly regulating social media platforms have generally been approached in three ways: (1) The First amendment; (2) Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act [CDA] (47 U.S.C. § 230); and (3)
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA].64 However, due to the history, particularities and context behind these laws, each law will be addressed separately.

60. Id. at 72-74.
61. Sartor & Lorregia, supra note 48 (establishing that “public incitement to violence or hatred
directed to groups or individuals on the basis of certain characteristics, including race, colour, religion, descent and national or ethnic origin” constitutes as hate speech with no definition of hate
speech in the US); Ruth Levush, Comparative Summary in Limits on Freedom of Expression, LAW
LIBR. OF CONGRESS, 1, 3 (2019) (noting that Germany and the Netherlands specifically recognize
limitations on speech that constitutes a denial or praise of atrocities committed during the holocaust).
62. Madiega, supra note 18, at 5.
63. CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 22.
64. KELLER, supra note 1, at 4; BRANNON, supra note 2, at Abstract.
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First, the majority of internet related First Amendment cases have focused on the actions of internet companies rather than their character, thus
whether or not those companies are social media platforms is irrelevant to
the analysis.65 Further, attempts at regulating platforms under the First
Amendment have focused on, and failed to succeed in treating those platforms as state actors.66 Nonetheless, insofar as a private actor exercises functions that were traditionally and exclusively held by the state, or that actor’s
actions were so closely regulated by the state such that the former’s actions
can be fairly treated as that of the state itself, that actor can be subject to the
First Amendment.67 In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner [exclusive powers test], the
Supreme Court clarified that claimants arguing that the private actor exercised the traditional and exclusive functions of the state must satisfy a high
threshold: that the actor’s exercise of these powers was such that the actor
essentially “stood in the shoes of the state.”68 In Packingham v. North Carolina [extensive supervision test] the Court held that social media platforms
can serve as public forums, insofar as they are important places for people to
speak and listen, and that social media users in particular engage in a wide
array of protected First amendment activities.69 Nevertheless, the Court previously held that simply opening a private place to the public is, without
more, insufficient to entitle the public to First Amendment protections.70 Alternatively, the Court noted that the public may be granted First Amendment
protections if a private company is sufficiently under the state’s control;
however, this requires extensive state regulation, and lower courts have interpreted this as requiring state operation or management of the company’s
website.71 Thus, whether under the exclusive powers, or the extensive supervision test, social media platforms have been highly resistant, if not immune
to First Amendment arguments. Specifically this means that private companies are not required to carry user content, and may remove or limit access
to that content as they see fit. The concern here is that, insofar as it is economically beneficial, private intermediaries may not only remove illegal

65. BRANNON, supra note 2, at 1.
66. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).
67. See id. at 295; Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972); Jackson v. Metro. Edison
Co., 419 US 345, 350-52 (1952).
68. 407 U.S. at 569.
69. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017).
70. BRANNON, supra note 2, at 24 (citing Tanner, 407 U.S. at 569).
71. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. 419 U.S. at 350; see also Quigley v. Yelp Inc., No. 17cv-03771-RS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103771 at 5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2017).
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content but unpopular or offensive content as well; moreover, this is especially likely when such content is expected to drive other users away.72
Additionally, even if intermediaries were sued on non-constitutional
grounds, §230 of the CDA provides intermediaries with broad immunity.
Social media platforms (i.e. intermediaries) like Facebook constitute as interactive computer services [ICS], and as such are entitled to: (1) not be
treated as the publishers or speakers of any information, regardless of the
nature of that information; and (2) such services may not be held liable for
voluntarily acting in good faith to remove or restrict access to objectionable
content on their platforms.73 These protections indicate that intermediaries
will not only avoid liability for not removing illegal or offensive content uploaded by their users, but can freely restrict access to that content if it is for
non-fraudulent reasons.74 Furthermore, several courts have held that an ICS
would lose its immunity if it materially contributed to the alleged illegality
of the content by being responsible for that illegality through, for example,
willfully publishing content that the service knows is unlawful.75 Nevertheless, § 230 does not provide complete immunity. For example, § 230(e)(2)
continues to allow for lawsuits alleging a violation of intellectual property
[IP], otherwise the laws protecting IP would be limited.76 This leads to the
third direct approach to regulating content moderation by social media platforms in the US: the DMCA.
In contrast with the other approaches, the DMCA imposes strict obligations upon platforms; however, these obligations have somewhat adversely
affected users. Assuming that a particular platform has fulfilled the safe harbor requirements under the DMCA, such as by designating an agent to whom
copyright owners may send infringement notices, this platform may qualify
as a hosting service under § 512(c).77 Host services are generally immune
from secondary liability if they: (1) do not know or have reason to know that
the material posted to websites they host is infringing; (2) are either unable
to control what their customers post to their sites or gain no direct financial
benefit from those postings (such as a fee for each item posted); (3) adopt
and implement a policy for terminating service to repeat infringers, and not
72. KELLER, supra note 1, at 23.
73. 47 USC §230(f)(2) (defining interactive computer service as “any information service,
system, or software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.”); 47 USC §230(c)(1), (2); see Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (holding that companies like Facebook are interactive computer services).
74. See CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 14, 27.
75. See Fair House Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, 1170 (9th Cir.
2008) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)); see also Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755
F.3d 398, 413 (6th Cir. 2014).
76. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); § 512 (c)(2).
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undercut the effectiveness of standard technological protection measures
(such as encryption); and (4) crucially, they must comply with the “noticeand-take-down” provisions under § 512(i).78 While this is somewhat similar
to §230, a major divergence is the “notice and takedown” provisions. Therein
lies the issue. Platforms are obligated to take down genuinely unlawful material that they are notified of or discover under this provision, but in doing
so have been criticized for excessively taking down objectionable content. 79
Particularly due to the DMCA, these takedowns arguably resulted from either: (a) an overabundance of caution, as well as to avoid the costs of having
lawyers assess the legitimacy of the content; or (b) the platforms failed to
verify users’ claims regarding the content’s illegality.80 Though other platforms have tried to sift through such user claims, these efforts are somewhat
rare.81 With content moderation in general, these takedowns have been exacerbated by automated content filters, and in some cases have even left unlawful content untouched.82 Adding to this problem are calls by policy makers to apply ex ante automation to specific forms of speech; however, as
previously noted, automated filters are not yet capable of effectively avoiding collateral takedowns.83 Furthermore, while the DMCA neither explicitly
requires platforms to proactively moderate content, nor apply the DMCA’s
rules extraterritorially, platforms nevertheless tend to opt for globalized solutions.84 This tendency is partially because it is logistically and technically
easier for companies like Facebook and Google to have a single set of Community Guidelines that are adjusted/expanded in response to governmental
pressure.85 It is also easier for their engineers to develop content filters that
work globally rather than customize filters for a variety of locales.86 This
example of local laws with global effects is even more prevalent in Europe
where policy makers both regionally, and at the state levels have been more
willing to directly influence moderation practices.
78. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C); § 512(i); see BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 62 (citing
§512(c)(1)(A)).
79. KELLER, supra note 1, at 3; BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 75.
80. KELLER, supra note 1, at 3.
81. Id.
82. CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 17; BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 75 (noting that in a
random sample of over 1800 DMCA takedown requests, a significant number of requests either
incorrectly identified or insufficiently specified the allegedly infringing work).
83. BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 75, 82-85; see ACCESS NOW, supra note 7.
84. BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 86.
85. Id.
86. KELLER, supra note 1, at 8.

50

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14:1

iii. EU Approach to Regulating Social Media Platforms

Unlike the US’ relatively sedate approach to content moderation, the
EU is currently developing how social media platforms, and other digital
service providers behave within the EU’s borders.87 The EU’s regard for free
speech is highly similar to the US insofar as issues such as shocking or offensive content is concerned, but that regard is not universally applied among
EU countries.88 Specifically, safety and economic considerations have sometimes superseded concerns over free speech.89 Thus, the EU’s approach to
regulating digital services in general, and content moderation in particular
explicitly implicates multiple stakeholders and perspectives. Knowing how
this approach applies to platforms like Facebook, and why a new approach
is under development requires an understanding of the eCommerce Directive
[the Directive].
Since 2000, the EU’s Directive has been used to govern digital services
with the overall goal of fostering e-commerce throughout Europe; however,
the Directive’s fragmented application, and the lack of adequate content
moderation policies triggered calls for a supplementary approach – The Digital Services Act Package [the DSA Package].90 Despite its shortcomings,
several of the Directive’s principles remain significant, specifically Articles
14 (Hosting providers) and 15 (no general obligation to monitor).91 Article
14 provides that if a company storing user data lacks actual or constructive
knowledge (i.e. is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal
activity or information is apparent), the company is not liable for that data’s
content.92 Hosting providers can retain their immunity if they expeditiously
remove or disable access to illegal activities or information of which they
have actual knowledge.93 Although member states cannot mandate that service providers actively monitor for illicit content, the Court of Justice of the
European Union [CJEU] established that member states can direct platforms
87. Alice Tidey, Ana Lazaro & Jack Parrock, Digital Services Act: Brussels vows to put order
into chaos of digital world with new tech laws, EURONEWS (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/12/15/digital-services-act-brussels-unveils-landmark-plans-to-regulate-techcompanies.
88. Levush, supra note 61, at 3 (noting that the European Court of Human Rights has declared
that freedom of speech applies to ideas that “offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population.”).
89. See Article 19, At a glance: Does the EU Digital Services Act protect freedom of expression?, EUR. DIGIT. RTS. (Mar. 10, 2021), https://edri.org/our-work/does-the-eu-digital-servicesact-protect-freedom-of-expression/.
90. Madiega, supra note 18, at 2-5.
91. Tambiama Madiega, Reform of the EU Liability Regime for Online Intermediaries: Background on the Forthcoming Digital Services Act, Study Commissioned by the Directorate-General
for Parliamentary Research Service, PE 649.404, 2-3 (May 2020).
92. 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13.
93. Madiega, supra note 91, at 3.
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to detect and prevent specific types of illegal content under those states’
laws.94
In Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited, the plaintiff
was the former head of the Austrian Green party, and was called a corrupt
oaf and member of a fascist party on Facebook.95 Facebook disabled access
to that content in Austria, and a criminal court held that Facebook had to
cease disseminating equivalent content only if Facebook had knowledge of
that content; however, an Austrian civil court held that the content was ‘excessively harmful’ to the plaintiff’s reputation and held Facebook liable.96
Following a referral to the CJEU, the Court broadly held that injunctions
requiring platforms to proactively remove both identical and equivalent content are permitted by the Directive.97 Additionally, injunctions to block particular content identified by a court are also permitted.98 That said, such injunctions cannot require the platform to independently assess whether
specific content violates the law.99 Moreover, the CJEU previously differentiated between impermissible general monitoring and permissible specific
injunctions in L’Oreal SA and Others v. eBay International AG and Others.100 The Court held that online service providers cannot be ordered to actively monitor all user data, but they can be ordered to terminate a particular
user’s account or make that user easier to identify.101 These rulings and provisions highlight several major, and widely supported principles: (1) country
of origin principles i.e. providers must comply with the laws of a member
state to access the EU Single Market; (2) the Limited Liability Regime provides that online intermediaries are exempt from the content they convey/host if they fulfill certain conditions [safe harbor principle] e.g. hosts
must expeditiously remove illegal content once they know of it; and (3)
member states cannot impose a general obligation to monitor information
that providers, for example, store for their users.102 Still, despite these virtues, the European Commission found large variances in the way the

94. 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13; Keller, supra note 51, at 616; Madiega, supra note 91, at 3.
95. Keller, supra note 51, at 617.
96. Id.; Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 3 October 2019 ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶
14, 17-18.
97. Keller, supra note 51, at 617.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 July 2011 ECLI:EU:C:2011:474.
101. Id. at ¶¶139, 141-42.
102. Madiega, supra note 91, at 2-3; Madiega, supra note 18, at 2-3.
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Directive was implemented throughout the EU.103 Specifically, national case
law on intermediary liability remains highly fragmented due to conflicts between court rulings, and uncertainty regarding the application of national
norms.104 Furthermore, before 2021, the European Commission generally relied on online platforms to voluntarily commit to codes of conduct or practices directly related to content moderation practices.105 These practices included, among other things, providing monthly reports to the European
Commission on actions undertaken to tackle fake accounts.106 While several
major platforms have agreed to these codes of conduct, it has been ineffective with respect to moderating some types of objectionable content such as
misinformation.107 This fragmentation, coupled with a lack of clear guidance
on how to supervise digital services resulted in several issues namely: users’
increased exposure to illegal and harmful content; market dominance by certain platforms; and a divided EU Single market.108 In response, the Commission [on the basis of Art. 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] put forward the Package to “prevent divergences from
hampering the free provision of cross-border digital services and to guarantee the uniform protection of rights and uniform obligations for businesses
and consumers across the internal market.”109 Even though it is not yet in
force, the Package’s provisions have elicited lively responses from multiple
stakeholders, including social media platforms.110
In light of these issues, the DSA package presents promising, albeit underdeveloped, solutions to the content moderation problem. The package is
comprised of two pieces of legislation: (a) the eponymous DSA which focuses on making a safer digital space in which user rights are protected, and
(b) the Digital Markets Act [DMA] which focuses on curbing the market
dominance of platforms like Facebook to increase competitiveness, growth
and development both regionally and abroad.111 The DSA focuses on
103. Madiega, supra note 18, at 2-3.
104. Id.
105. Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16, at 75.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 78.
108. Id. at 1; Madiega, supra note 18, at 3.
109. Eur. Comm’n, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC,
COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020), at 7.
110. See generally Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16; Article 19, supra note 89; Jan Penfrat, The
EU’s attempt to regulate Big Tech: What it brings and what is missing, EDRI (Dec. 18, 2020)
https://edri.org/our-work/eu-attempt-to-regulate-big-tech/; DOT Europe, DOT Europe preliminary
remarks on the DSA: Consider the focus, scope and coherence of the proposal (Feb. 2021),
https://doteurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/DOT-Europe-DSA-high-level-remarksFebruary-2021-.pdf.
111. Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16, at 64-5.
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ensuring platform transparency and protecting users’ fundamental rights
through a tiered set of provisions.112 Under the DSA, every digital platform
or service that connects users to goods is obligated to undertake certain duties with respect to how they handle user data and illegal content.113 All platforms are required to clearly and unambiguously keep users informed on
how user information is collected, what it is used for, and metadata on user
targeted ads. 114 Platforms must provide clear-cut notice and takedown mechanisms, along with detailed reports on how the user’s content was illegal or
how that content violated the platform’s terms and conditions.115 Additional
obligations apply to very large operating platforms (VLOPs) with over 45
million users a month including: clarifying the key determinants used by
their algorithms to curate and rank content; analyzing the systemic risks
posed by using the platform, as well as implementing effective content moderation mechanisms to mitigate those risks; and undergoing annual independent audits, along with employing a dedicated compliance officer to ensure the platforms’ compliance under the DSA.116 Also, unlike similar past
ventures by the European Commission, the Package emphasizes fundamental rights like free speech by retaining conditional immunity from liability
for hosting providers and the prohibition on general monitoring.117 By preserving the protections under the Directive, the DSA package can reduce the
risk of unnecessary takedowns.118 Users’ speech rights are further protected
by requiring platforms to participate in, and subsequently report on, out of
court dispute settlements with users regarding illegal content takedowns.119
That said, the DSA and the DMA are not, and should not be understood, as
distinct acts.
Though seemingly separate, the DMA & DSA are complimentary and
are rooted in the concept of user data.120 The DMA focuses on so called
‘gatekeepers’ such as Facebook or Google or other platforms which satisfy
a ‘three-limbed test’: (1) they have a significant impact on the European internal market; (2) they provide a core platform service which serves as an
112. Madiega, supra note 18, at 6.
113. Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16, at 65.
114. Id. at 6.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 6.
117. See generally, Eur. Conv. On H.R., Art. 10 (freedom of expression); Article 19, supra
note 89 (noting that the Package contains 11 mentions of fundamental rights).
118. See supra Part II(C)(iii).
119. Article 19, supra note 89.
120. Id.; See supra Part II(A).

54

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14:1

important gateway for business users to reach end users; and (3) they enjoy
an entrenched position in their operations, or it is foreseeable that they will
enjoy such a position in the near future.121 Here, 53% of all EU enterprises
use Facebook, and in the first quarter of 2021 Facebook recorded 423 million
European users per month.122 Adding to this is that Facebook’s worldwide
social media market share increased from 64% in 2019 to roughly 70% in
2020, conversely platforms like Twitter and Tumblr remained below 16%.123
Facebook therefore dominates the social media market. As previously discussed, platforms like Facebook grew and developed by collecting user data
to maintain user attention, and thereby implementing more narrowly tailored
ads; furthermore, their users’ mistrust notwithstanding, these platforms continued to exist and even thrive.124 In addition, because of this business model
and a lack of regulation (e.g. antitrust laws), major platforms like Facebook
have become gatekeepers to their respective markets.125 Gatekeepers can restrict competition through e.g. predatory pricing or purchasing potential
competitors thereby limiting consumers’ choice in platforms.126 This in turn
allows firms to impose oppressive contract terms against advertisers, and extract greater amounts of user data.127 Limiting competitor access to user data
prevents those competitors from delivering that data to advertisers as advertisers are less likely to utilize those competitors’ services.128 To mitigate
these effects, the DMA regulates gatekeeping activities by prohibiting acts
like self-referencing; imposing an obligation to share collected data with
both business users and regular users; and even forbidding the reuse of personal data by copying it onto other products (e.g. Facebook copying your
WhatsApp address book onto Facebook’s main platform).129 By

121. Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16, at 64-66.
122. Id. at 18; S. Dixon, Facebook: Quarterly MAU in Europe Q4 2012-Q1 2021, STATISTA
(July 28, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/745400/facebook-europe-mau-by-quarter/.
123. Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16, at 25-26.
124. See supra Part II(A)-(B).
125. Gawer & Srniceck, supra note 16, at 27; Nadler & Cicilline, Investigation of Competition
in Digital Markets, STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM., AND ADMIN. L., 116TH CONG.,
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 39 (Comm. Print 2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf?utm_campaign=4493-519 (hereinafter Subcommittee Print).
126. Mike Isaac, Facebook Posts a 33 Percent Increase in Revenue and a 53 Percent Jump in
Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/business/facebook-earnings.html; Subcommittee Print, supra note 125, at 390.
127. Id.
128. CHO & GALLO, supra note 8, at 14.
129. Jan Penfrat, The EU’s Attempt to Regulate Big Tech: What it Brings and What is Missing,
EDRI (Dec. 18, 2021), https://edri.org/our-work/eu-attempt-to-regulate-big-tech (exemplifying
self-referencing as Google listing Gmail as the first option when users do a google search for email
providers).
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understanding the connection between user data and market dominance, the
complimentary nature of the DSA & DMA can be established.130 One problem though, is that a holistic examination of the DSA package has not been
sufficiently emphasized, and that this, among other shortcomings are likely
to undermine the package’s efficacy.131
Though the DSA Package emphasizes user rights by improving platform transparency and accountability, it is unlikely to sufficiently deter excessive takedowns nor rein in the gatekeepers.132 Despite safeguards against
excessive takedowns such as: Article 15 (platforms must explain the reasoning behind the removal); Article 14.2(a) (users have to explain why they believe the specific content is illegal); and Article 20.2 (online platforms must
adopt measures against misuse e.g. users submitting a manifestly ill-founded
notice regarding some content’s alleged illegality), the DSA Package still
falls short of the mark.133 Platforms generally have a ‘delete first, ask questions later’ mentality, and though some DSA critics applauded these new
safeguards, other provisions arguably aggravate this mentality. For example,
once platforms receive “substantiated notice” of some content’s illegality,
that constitutes actual knowledge for the purpose of host immunity under
Art. 5.134 Therefore, hosting providers gain a strong incentive to remove content upon notice. Connected to this is that VLOPs [which are not always
gatekeepers] are required to annually assess, among other things, their content moderation systems for weaknesses or shortcomings; however, a logistical and practical flaw here is that a VLOPs’ compliance with the DSA
Package must be assessed by the European Commission [rather than a dedicated independent regulator].135 Efforts to improve content moderation practices are also undercut by the DSA [act]’s language which, though only focused on illegal content is still overbroad, and despite certain safeguards136

130. See Madiega, supra note 18, at 2.
131. Article 19, supra note 89.
132. Id.; DOT Europe, supra note 110; The Digital Markets Act must do more to protect end
users’ rights, EDRi (Feb. 11, 2021); Penfrat, supra note 110; Keller, supra note 51, at 620.
133. Article 19, supra note 89.
134. Id.
135. See Id.
136. See e.g., Penfrat, supra note 110 (noting that the Commission requires platforms to use
independent, certified dispute settlement bodies with whom complaints of wrongful content removal can be submitted).
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raises the risk of objectionable content being unnecessarily removed.137 Finally, despite the DMA’s virtues it does not adequately focus on easing barriers to enter the social media market, and thereby fails to adequately give
[both business and normal] users more choice between platforms.138 The provisions and potential outcomes of the DSA Package notwithstanding, the actual long-term effects and ramifications are currently unknown. However,
now that platforms face mandatory regulations, they have begun to take a
more proactive rather than reactive approach to content moderation.139 For
example, in 2020 the European Commission Vice-President for Values and
Transparency, and Twitter’s CEO sought to develop rules which, rather than
compel platforms to remove objectionable content, instead affect how objectionable content manifests and propagates on those platforms.140 At the risk
of speculating, this example illustrates how aggressive government regulatory practices in conjunction with meaningful government-platform collaborations can effectively balance safety concerns with users’ right to speak.
This argument will be studied further in Part III, but as examined below the
DSA Package alone is insufficient to mollify excessive content moderation.
iv. Gaps in the Framework

As social media platforms generally apply their community standards
worldwide, regional or even country specific regulations can have a global
impact. To avoid sudden structural changes, platforms have attempted to predict potential government regulations, and preemptively adapt through e.g.
content filtering; however, this technology is imperfect, and pressure from
both well-informed and misinformed policy makers has sometimes caused
unnecessary takedowns or excessive moderation on a global scale.141 The US
& EU have, until the DSA Package, emphasized a ‘notice and takedown’
system, and were thus more reactive rather than proactive.142 Platforms on
the other hand have mostly attempted to stay ahead of the regulatory curb
137. DOT Europe, supra note 110 (arguing that Art 2(g) partially defines illegal content as
including information that references activities that are illegal either under EU or member states’
laws).
138. EDRi, supra note 132.
139. Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16, at 78.
140. Id.
141. Article 19, supra note 89; Elizabeth Dwoskin and Gerrit de Vynck, Facebook’s AI treats
Palestinian Activists like it treats American Black Activists. It blocks them, THE WASHINGTON
POST (May 29, 2021, 8:09PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/05/28/facebook-palestinian-censorship/; BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 63, 82-85; Keller, supra note 51, at
619; KELLER, supra note 1, at 5-9; Judit Bayer & Petra Bárd, Hate Speech and Hate Crime in the
EU and the Evaluation of Online Content Regulation Approaches, Study Commissioned by the
European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, PE 655.135, 3647 (2020).
142. BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 63.
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through a kind of ‘anticipatory obedience,’ by predicting new laws, and adjusting their policies accordingly.143 Content filtering technology like Facebook’s hash database for violent extremists or YouTube’s Content ID system
are manifestations of this approach.144 Unfortunately this technology is still
unrefined.145 For example, hashes are essentially unique digital fingerprints
of specific kinds of content (e.g. beheadings conducted by terrorists) which
are then collected in a database that the platform’s algorithm ‘learns’ from
and uses to compare to user content that might match the contents of the
database.146 However, while this process has seen great success in, for example, deleting 99% of ISIS content before it was flagged by users, in late
May 2021 Facebook and Twitter mistakenly blocked and later restored millions of Palestinian accounts and posts related to the recent strife.147 Facebook’s explanation was that its hate speech detection software mistakenly
classified a key hashtag as belonging to a terrorist group.148 A father’s happy
birthday wish to his son ‘Qassam’ was also likely blocked because Facebook
blocks many posts about Hamas’ military branch: the al-Qassam Brigades.149
The exact capabilities of Facebook’s filtering tools are not known, and that
is part of the problem.150 Though the DSA Package is an encouraging step,
some critics underscored the lack of transparency on content filters, specifically the need for detailed reports on false positives and negatives.151 Despite
these problems, outside actors such as courts have demonstrated some undue
optimism here: specifically by assuming that platforms are capable of certain
kinds of filtering that are actually beyond those platforms’ capabilities.152 In
the EU, several platforms have even warned against including the language
‘not-illegal-but-harmful’ content in potential regulations since it forces the
platforms to draw the line between user safety, and freedom of speech and

143. KELLER, supra note 1, at 2.
144. BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 63, 65-66.
145. Keller, supra note 51, at 619.
146. BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 65-66.
147. Dwoskin & de Vynck, supra note 141; BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 57-62.
148. Dwoskin & de Vynck, supra note 141.
149. Id.
150. See generally Keller, supra note 51.
151. Article 19, supra note 89.
152. BLOCH-WEHBA, supra note 5, at 72-74 (noting how in the Glawischnig-Piesczek case,
the CJEU made inferences that Facebook had the ‘software magic’ to prevent the republication of
defamatory content).
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information.153 Thus, to avoid a conflict of laws, platforms have urged that
they should only be responsible for removing illegal content.154 When these
companies draw lines, they often do so throughout their platform, and in
every country wherein that platform is used.155 EU regulations can therefore
impact Facebook’s content moderation throughout the world. As discussed
in Part II(C)(ii) above, it is often technically, logistically, and legally easier
for companies to filter out certain kinds of content everywhere rather than
filtering them in a particular location. On that note, it is precisely the desire
to avoid drawing lines that Facebook developed an alternative, and allegedly
independent oversight solution; The Facebook Oversight Board.156
v.

The Facebook Oversight Board

The Facebook Oversight Board [the Board] is a private appeals system
focusing solely on Facebook and Instagram’s content moderation decisions,
specifically to help Facebook understand what content should be kept up or
taken down and why.157 The Board is currently composed of 20 (with a minimum of 11 and a maximum of 40) multinational, multidisciplinary individuals whose authority is provided by a trust agreement which explicitly separates the Board from Facebook, and places the former under the authority of
an independent trust.158 The Board’s independence was enhanced by Facebook’s initial gift of $130 million to the Trust, which used it to fund, manage,
and develop an LLC that would provide the Board’s future source of funding.159 This independence is vital to the Board’s mandate of promoting free
expression through principled, independent decisions regarding Facebook
and Instagram’s (owned by Facebook) content moderation decisions.160 Although, this independence is perhaps undermined by both the rules that
153. Gawer & Srnieck, supra note 16, at 77 (giving an example where public insult of religion
or blasphemy, is considered legal in Denmark or France, but is illegal in Germany, Poland, Spain,
or Italy).
154. Id. at 77.
155. KELLER, supra note 1, at 6-8.
156. Kate Cox, Facebook plans launch of its own “Supreme Court” for handling takedown
appeals, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 18, 2019, 3:17 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/09/facebook-plans-launch-of-its-own-supreme-court-for-handling-takedown-appeals/.
157. Oversight Board Charter, Article 1 §4 (2019), https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf.
158. Id. at Article 1 §1; Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2481 (2020); Expertise
from Around the World, OVERSIGHT BD., https://oversightboard.com/meet-the-board/ (last visited
May 30, 2021) (highlighting the diversity of the members, as well as their various areas of expertise
e.g. journalism, constitutional law, technology regulation and policy design).
159. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 157, at Article 1 §5; Klonick, supra note 158, at
2486.
160. Cox, supra note 156.
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govern the appeals process and those governing the Board’s decision-making
process.161 First, appealing content decisions on Facebook is a five-step process requiring users to satisfy several pre-requisites, namely that Facebook
has to review a user’s case and render a final decision; in addition, that decision must include a reference ID that can be used to submit an appeal.162
Though this might suggest that Facebook controls which cases are subject to
the Board’s review, this is undercut by the manner in which the Board selects
cases. The Board uses its discretion to choose cases that are emblematic of
major issues in content moderation such as censorship of hate speech, female
nudity, and covid-19 misinformation.163 However, while the rules governing
the appeals process are arguably adequate, the rules governing the decisionmaking process present a different issue. The Board’s decisions are derived
from several sources, and with objectionable content in particular they are:
(a) Facebook’s Community Standards [specifically under the ‘Objectionable
Content’ category]; (b) Facebook’s Values (e.g. users’ rights to voice their
views); and (c) Human Rights Standards (e.g. the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]).164 Though the Board began accepting cases around October 2020, it has rendered twelve decisions
as of May 26th, 2021; nevertheless, there are few cases pertaining to Facebook’s Objectionable Content standards in the US and EU, and most of those
cases focus on hate speech.165 Facebook defines hate speech as a direct attack
on people based on protected characteristics like race.166 Facebook prohibits
users from posting content that targets a person or group on the basis of such
characteristics using “designated dehumanizing” generalizations or behavioral statements such as blackface.167 However, content shared to condemn

161. See Klonick, supra note 158, at 2478, 2488.
162. Appealing Content Decisions on Facebook or Instagram, OVERSIGHT BD., https://oversightboard.com/appeals-process/ (last visited May 30, 2021).
163. Elena DeBré, The Independent Facebook Oversight Board has made its First Rulings,
SLATE (Jan. 2021, 7:23 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/01/facebook-oversight-boardscontent-moderation-rulings.html (finding that out of 150,000 cases submitted in December 2020,
the Board chose 6); Oversight Board Charter, supra note 157, at Article 2 §1 (establishing that the
Board will select cases “that have the greatest potential to guide future decisions and policies”).
164. See generally Oversight Board Charter, supra note 157, at Article 2 §2.
165. Brian Fung, Facebook’s Oversight Board is Finally Hearing Cases, Two Years after it
was First Announced, CNN (Oct. 2020, 4:45 PM GMT), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/22/tech/facebook-oversight-board/index.html.
166. See Facebook Community Standards, §3(12).
167. Id.
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or raise awareness about such types of hate speech is an exception.168 These
exceptions to the Community Standard exist to uphold one of Facebook’s
core values: Voice i.e., creating a place for users to express their diverse
views, ideas, and information.169 However, given the potential for abuse on
the internet, these values are balanced against considerations like safety
(making Facebook a safe, user-friendly environment) and dignity (mitigating
the harassment and degradation of others to ensure their dignity).170 Furthermore, given Facebook’s impact on human rights, user content is voluntarily
assessed under the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights, under which
several human rights instruments are available.171 Despite the dearth of
cases, content moderation is an ever-developing process, and by assessing
how the Oversight Board has led this issue, insight into a platform-perspective approach can be gained, and existing gaps to this process can be filled.
Facebook cannot effectively evaluate whether a user’s contribution
constitutes hate speech without first understanding how its users think, and
examining the context of that speech. User content constitutes hate speech
when the factual circumstances, including user intent, are assessed through
three lenses: (1) Facebook’s Community Standards; (2) Facebook’s Values;
and (3) International Human Rights law, and is subsequently found to be an
unprotected form of speech.172 However, unless used to condemn or raise
awareness about some hate speech, certain forms of speech are sufficiently
egregious as to raise the risk to people’s safety and dignity and may be removed regardless of user intent or cultural values.173 In April 2021, the Board
rendered its decision on whether to uphold Facebook’s removal of a video
of ‘Sinterklaas’ and ‘Zwarte Piet’ that were posted for the user’s friends and
family.174 In Dutch Christmas tradition, ‘Zwarte Piet’ or ‘Black Pete’ is ‘Sinterklaas’’ (St. Nicholas) helper, and is often portrayed in blackface with exaggerated lips, and gold earrings.175 Although the user and many Dutch
168. Case Decision 2021-002-FB-UA, Reference ID: FB-S6NRTDAJ, OVERSIGHT BD., at 8
(Apr. 13, 2021), https://oversightboard.com/decision/FB-S6NRTDAJ/ (hereinafter Zwarte Piet Decision).
169. Updating the Values that Inform our Community Standards, Facebook (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-values-that-inform-our-community-standards/.
170. Id.; Zwarte Piet Decision, supra note 168, at 5-6.
171. Zwarte Piet Decision, supra note 168, at 6 (highlighting the ICESCR and its general comments).
172. Zwarte Piet Decision, supra note 168, at 5-8; Case Decision 2021-005-FB-UA, Reference
ID: FB-RZL57, OVERSIGHT BOARD, at 2, 5-8 (May 20, 2021), https://oversightboard.com/decision/FB-RZL57QHJ/ (hereafter Two Buttons Meme Decision).
173. Zwarte Piet Decision, supra note 168, at 11.
174. Id. at 1, 5.
175. Becky Little, This Notorious Christmas Character is Dividing a Country, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/black-pete-christmas-zwarte-piet-dutch.
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people view Zwarte Piet as lacking any racial intent, Facebook has, since
August 2020, explicitly prohibited caricatures of Black people under its Hate
Speech Community Standards, specifically blackface.176 The Board held that
despite the user’s innocent intent, blackface is inherently discriminatory under Facebook’s Community Standards, regardless of user intent.177 Moreover, even though the video was intended for a small number of people, portrayals of Zwarte Piet have been inextricably linked to negative and racist
stereotypes that can harm Black People’s dignity and safety if left unchecked.178 Finally, though the right to participate in cultural life, and the
freedom of expression (including ‘deeply offensive’ expression) are enshrined in international law, those rights are not absolute.179 Such rights notwithstanding, Facebook properly restricted those rights by: (1) clearly and
precisely notifying users through information videos and newsfeeds, that
barring an exception, content featuring blackface will be removed (legality);
(2) Facebook’s restrictions were legitimate because they were aimed at protecting the right to equality and non-discrimination; and (3) the restrictions
were necessary and proportionate to those interests because of the harms
posed (both physically and emotionally) in allowing this type of content to
accumulate.180 Facebook’s restrictions were thus deemed valid under the
Community Standards, Facebook’s values, and Facebook’s human rights obligations, and as such the Board upheld the removal.181
Conversely, in May 2021, the Board overturned Facebook’s removal of
a meme relating to Turkey’s views of the Armenian genocide because that
meme fell under Facebook’s exception for content that condemns or raises
awareness of hatred.182 The user used the ‘Two Buttons’ meme to point out
the irony of Turkey’s denial of Armenian genocide, while also claiming that
the genocide was justified.183 The ‘Two Buttons’ or ‘Daily Struggle’ meme
is an image of a sweating character attempting to push one of two red buttons

176. Zwarte Piet Decision, supra note 168, at 2.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Id. 11.
179. Id. 12 (citing United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999
UNTS 171, Arts. 2, 19(3) (23 March 1976) and Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34,
Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, CCPR/C/CG/34, ¶¶11-12 (Sept. 12, 2011)).
180. Zwarte Piet Decision, supra note 168, at 13-14.
181. Id. at 15-18.
182. Two Buttons Meme Decision, supra note 178, at 1.
183. See Annex 1; Two Buttons Meme Decision, supra note 178, at 1, 7.
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with contradictory statements.184 Here, the Board applied the same standards
as the ‘Zwarte Piet’ case; however, to assess the content under the Community Standards, the Board addressed the comments on the buttons individually before juxtaposing them in the context of the meme.185 The first statement, ‘The Armenian Genocide is a lie’ was viewed by Facebook as a direct
attack on a protected characteristic (ethnicity or national origin), but, upon
considering the user’s intent and type of meme used, the Board held that the
statement was intended to satirize Turkey’s denial.186 The second statement:
‘The Armenians were terrorists that deserved it,’ though seemingly dehumanizing was quite the opposite.187 When assessing the phrases as part of the
meme, the majority held that the user clearly intended to use satire to raise
awareness of and condemn Turkey’s efforts to deny the Armenian Genocide
whilst simultaneously vilifying the victims as terrorists.188 With regards to
Facebook’s values, the Board held that despite the Armenians’ struggle during those events and their efforts to gain recognition and justice for those
harms, the meme was unlikely to undermine peoples’ safety and dignity.189
Finally, the Board held that given the particularly high value of artistic expressions concerning public figures under international law and Facebook’s
misunderstanding of the meme, Facebook’s restrictions were invalid under
international law.190 Specifically: (1) Facebook both wrongfully applied an
inappropriate standard to the meme (the Cruel and Insensitive Community
Standard), and failed to properly notify the users of the reason for the enforcement; (2) as there were no legitimate safety or dignity concerns, Facebook’s restrictions lacked a legitimate aim; and (3) the restriction was unnecessary because rather than undermine the right of Armenians to equality
and non-discrimination, the meme was intended to do the opposite by condemning the Turkish government’s “contradictory and self-serving position.”191 While not necessarily indicative of how the Board might deal with
other types of objectionable content, the Board’s method of dealing with
Hate speech reflects a globalized approach to content moderation. Though
the Board is obviously required to assess cases using Facebook’s regularly
updated community standards, that is inevitable given the ever-developing
definition of what constitutes objectionable content. Further, by assessing
184. Know Your Meme, Daily Struggle, KNOW YOUR MEME, https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/daily-struggle (last updated May 27, 2021).
185. Two Buttons Meme Decision, supra note 178, at 10.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 11-12.
188. Id. at 12.
189. Id. at 13.
190. See Two Buttons Meme Decision, supra note 178, at 16.
191. Id.

Winter 2023

REGULATING THE DIGITAL RESONANCE

63

those standards and values under the rubric of International Human Rights
law, the Board can avoid a country/region specific analysis, and instead use
a holistic assessment that can apply to people and cultures worldwide. The
Board also demonstrated an additional, and vital approach to content assessment in the Two Buttons Case - it understood how the meme worked, and
more generally how users think. Different memes have different uses, but
the way they come about is chaotic and highly context dependent. Here, Facebook’s moderators partially missed the intent behind the user’s submission, by failing to understand what the Two Buttons meme is used for. That
said, Facebook only has 15,000 moderators for 3 billion users, and attempting to apply the nuanced, contextual approach recommended by the board
requires a different approach.

III. Synthesizing A Solution
First, attempting to suggest solutions to a problem before other solutions like the DSA Package, and the Oversight Board have properly taken
root is premature. That said, based on the developments thus far there are
several key issues regulators should keep in mind going forward. First, the
core of the content moderation problem is the ‘attention economy’ and the
complimentary ‘network effect.’ Social media companies develop their content filters, and other algorithms in order to acquire as many users as possible
and retain them. These developments are not simply based on the desire for
a larger market share, but can also be caused by overly optimistic or even
short-sighted regulations. Additionally, though easing the barriers to entering the social media market might improve platform responsibility by incentivizing those platforms to develop safe, user-friendly platforms, it may exacerbate some issues as well. For example, though more platforms mean
more choices for consumers, platforms may attempt to more aggressively
retain their consumers by delivering more divisive i.e., more attention catching content. Thus, understanding and either mitigating or disincentivizing
the triggers that push platforms like Facebook to develop these practices is
vital to future regulatory practices. Second, the EU has, at least for now, indicated [but not necessarily proven] that aggressive regulation compels platforms to take notice and start suggesting solutions that help the governments
while minimizing damage to the platforms’ bottom line. Although there is a
risk of overcorrection, and even greater takedowns of objectionable content,
this risk can be reduced in at least four ways: (a) detailed, transparent reports
on all aspects of a platform’s content moderation practices, especially how
often its algorithms mis-report or fail to report illicit content; (b) annual independent audits by government provided auditors to assess how, and to
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what extent, a platform is developing its content moderation practices; (c)
focusing on regulating illegal content specifically, and requiring platforms
to hire more human moderators and independent auditors for the sake of objectionable content; (d) clarifying internal laws so that the platforms have an
easier time knowing what to look for and thereby help mitigate the ‘delete
first, ask questions later’ mentality. Third, local laws often have global effects and part of the problem here is that the laws of more restrictive countries end up applying to less restrictive countries. Though indirect, this can
affect a large portion of the public discourse. The advantage however is that
the reverse is technically also true; you do not need to change the rules everywhere for them to apply everywhere – aggressive but unified regulatory
measures in a few places can result in widespread changes to content moderation practices. This, however, is a double-edged sword, and risks imposing the values of states who can impose regulatory obligations over those
that cannot. Nevertheless, by understanding how and why platforms work
the way they do, Governments may be able to impose more nuanced regulations that effectively impact the platforms’ bottom line. Moreover, by collaborating with social media platforms, Government regulations can be tailored to suit those platforms’ capabilities. This in turn could mitigate the
‘delete first, ask questions later’ mentality, and result in more careful moderation practices.

IV. Conclusion
In the last several decades, social media platforms have expanded into
multinational entities affecting every aspect of human life from science and
medicine to art and religion, whether for good, bad or neither. A core part of
this expansion has been people, normal users whose reliance on platforms
like Facebook or others continues to grow. This reliance partially stems from
the need to communicate ideas, creations, and developments that range from
wholesome to vile. On either end of that spectrum the users’ reliance could
simply be based on the need for attention. User mentality however is beyond
the scope of this paper. The recent conflagration of misinformation, bullying,
harassment, hateful messages and overall negative albeit not necessarily illegal content, has accompanied the growth of social media. However, as
most users and as such, their governments, prefer reasonably safe and comfortable forums within which to express themselves, platforms have either
on their own initiative or from government pressure, attempted to establish
those forums. Algorithmic efforts like Facebook’s terrorism hash databases
have both succeeded and failed to moderate negative content, whether illicit
or objectionable, and has resulted in widespread harm to those users’ abilities
to freely express themselves. This failure is partially due to the scale at which
such platforms operate, overzealous yet shortsighted regulatory efforts, and

Winter 2023

REGULATING THE DIGITAL RESONANCE

65

in cases where regulation is relatively lacking (e.g., the US) the failure can
be caused by a platform’s excessive desire to retain users. Though some of
these efforts are economically efficient, they have resulted in an overdependence on computer-based moderation that is not yet capable of dissecting the
nuances of human language and intent. That said, and to their credit, some
platforms like Facebook have recognized this problem, and the broader issue
of differentiating between illegal content and offensive content which
[though uncomfortable] should nevertheless be allowed rather than shut out.
This is especially so when the content itself has been mischaracterized by
those algorithms. This realization however, and the subsequently developed
Facebook Oversight Board, as well as the EU’s DSA Package are encouraging for the future of content moderation. Nevertheless, both developments
are either too new or not yet in force, thus long-term studies of where these
developments lead will likely be necessary. Further, even though the Oversight Board has delivered some promising holdings, it is still too soon to say
how that will affect Facebook’s moderation practices in the long run. For
example, future researchers can analyze multiple Oversight Board cases on
specific topics over several years to see how much, and the way in which the
Board attaches weight to different sources like Facebook’s community
standards, human rights standards, Facebook values etc. Adding to this, I
would argue that a language analysis of different community standards/terms
and conditions across different platforms should be analyzed for similarities,
gaps, whether the gaps are similar, and whether the differences are all that
different. These recommendations, along with those previously discussed
must be considered alongside developments in the DSA Package and the
Oversight Board in order to protect not just user speech but user safety as
well.
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